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Donald Trump and Difficult Relations with Europe
donald Trump’s presidency has turned out to pose an enormous challenge to US-
European relations. It is difficult to escape the impression that this administration is 
unpredictable, its operations are dominated by chaos and emotions, and lack a thor-
ough concept and vision, especially in the international arena. The dignity of the US 
Presidential Office, and that of the leader of the West, has not been augmented by 
Trump’s governance style and by foreign policy exercised via his tweets. The devel-
opment and implementation of a coherent external strategy has not been facilitated 
by reshuffling in the circle of Trump’s closest associates and higher officials in his 
administration who were responsible for foreign policy and security. These person-
nel changes evidenced not so much a lack of skills in selecting a competent team, but 
rather the emotional and whimsical attitude of the incumbent President to his cowork-
ers. Although there are also positive signals, one can talk about a crisis in a number of 
fields, in particular in relations with Europe.
First and foremost, some concerns and doubts which emerged with respect to the 
Republican candidate during the election campaign have been confirmed. It was during 
this campaign that Trump questioned many important tenets of transatlantic coopera-
tion. First and foremost, he questioned the importance of NATO claiming that this is an 
“obsolete” structure (“The New York Times,” 2016). Never before had any important 
US politician, let alone the President, or an important candidate for the highest office 
in the United States, undermined the value of NATO in such a way, as they all appreci-
ated the importance of the North Atlantic Pact also for US interests.
Trump was also extremely unrelenting with respect to the uneven burden sharing 
by the allies under their joint security policy. This issue is far from new, and was ad-
dressed also by previous administrations. Yet the suggestions had not been as clear 
before: “The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense – and, 
if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves” (Trump, 
2016). Article 5 of the washington Treaty assumes unconditional solidarity in the 
case of any NATO member state being attacked, therefore such statements issued 
by Trump undermined the essence of NATO, questioning the future of the North 
Atlantic Pact.
It appeared as if the Republican candidate for the white House did not accept or 
understand that the global interests and responsibilities of the United States translate 
into greater expenses that have to be borne, and that only the United States has an 
operational potential at its disposal which is unattainable for the majority of US allies 
in Europe. Trump seemed not to notice that NATO constitutes a powerful factor de-
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termining the US position in the international arena and that global leadership has its 
price and requires outlays.
Treating European obligations in the manner typical of a businessman who is con-
cerned with profit, Trump may endanger the transatlantic community, which also cares 
about values and principles. He focuses on securing strictly American interests, which 
resembles the standards of the 19th century global order (wright, 2017a). This is the 
more dangerous, as Europe and the world in the 2010s have found themselves in an 
extremely difficult moment, when the existing international order is being undermined, 
and dangerous challenges are demanding a responsible and efficient response, not only 
to achieve particular narrow interests, but also to ensure security to the west, that is to 
the world of shared values.
The European Union, an embodiment of such a community of shared values, has 
become the subject of Trump’s criticism as well. As a rule, US presidents used to ap-
preciate European integration efforts, and viewed them as both the pursuit of shared 
values and principles and a factor which eliminated conflicts; the EU was also viewed 
as an important trade partner. Therefore, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the 
United States in stimulating the integration efforts undertaken by Western Europe in 
the 1950s and 1960s; also in the following decades the European project was largely 
appreciated in washington.
Trump, however, starting during the election campaign, made little of the Euro-
pean project, which actually followed from the fact that this businessman from New 
York viewed the EU as an economic competitor to US interests, especially in the field 
of trade exchange. For this Republican candidate, an opponent of the establishment 
and critic of all elites, the European project symbolized the world of ‘rotten liberal-
ism’ and cumbersome political correctness. when President Barack Obama visited the 
United Kingdom in April 2016 to persuade the British to remain in the EU, and then 
sent a special appeal from Germany, urging Europe to continue its integration efforts, 
almost at the same time Trump met the supporters of Brexit in the British Isles backing 
them up. He did not hide his satisfaction when the British voted for leaving the EU and 
called it a “great step.” He joined the anti-European sentiments, strongly intensifying 
in different countries, and expressed his hope that further exits would follow, and the 
European project would cease to exist.
As an ardent supporter of trade protectionism, Trump announced a rise in tariffs and 
the rejection or renegotiation of international trade agreements that the United States 
had signed earlier (for instance, Trump called the Trans-Pacific Free Trade Partner-
ship – TPP, signed in February 2016 “a potential disaster for our country”), therefore 
it should be assumed that, during his presidency, the TTIP that was being negotiated 
with the EU stood no chance of success.
Concerns were therefore justified that the Republican candidate, who views Europe 
more as a competitor than an ally, would try to weaken the EU if he won. He could, 
for instance, implement a policy of differentiation, whereby individual states would be 
‘torn away’ from the European community and, through bilateral negotiations, differ-
ent matters would be agreed, leading to the breakup of European unity on the one hand, 
and of the coherent cooperation of the United States and Europe on the other. Another 
deviation from washington policy in the past concerned Trump’s opinions announced 
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after his electoral victory that the EU is “a vehicle for Germany,” established for the 
purpose of efficiently competing against the United States in trade. Swiping against 
the strongest state in the EU, and thereby skillfully feeding anti-German sentiments in 
Europe, confirmed Trump’s dislike for the European project and constituted an attempt 
to undermine its coherence.
A highly catchy element of Trump’s “America First” election campaign was the 
message that different states sell in the United States more than they buy from it. 
Such trade partners were threatened to be blacklisted as “unfair trading partners.” Ger-
many and China could find themselves at the top of such a blacklist; and the German 
economy heavily relies on exports. Other strong accusations made against Berlin were 
related to the relatively low defense outlays in the German budget. It is true that the 
nearly 1.2% of GdP was far below the potential of the largest European economy, but 
the German government had made important declarations on this topic earlier. Any-
way, the 1.2% of Germany’s GdP accounted for USd 41 billion earmarked for defense 
in 2016, which is not a negligible amount. Therefore, Trump’s words did not serve the 
prospects of American-German relations well, although they were labelled “partners 
in leadership” once (Kiwerska, 2017, pp. 85ff).1
Trump’s electoral victory in November 2016 made this rather grim scenario a real-
ity, both in terms of the development of US-German relations and of the whole trans-
atlantic community. while it is true that election campaigns have their own rules, and 
words do not necessarily have to translate into deeds, Europe was impatiently waiting 
for the actual steps to be taken by the new presidential team. The first declarations 
were made by its representatives in February 2017, during the annual Munich Security 
Conference. Vice President Michael Pence did his best to sound credible when saying 
“on behalf of President Trump” that “the United States of America strongly supports 
NATO and we will be unwavering in our commitment to this transatlantic alliance” 
(Jones, 2017). US Secretary of defense, Gen. James Mattis, spoke in a similar vein 
when he met the heads of defense of NATO member states in Brussels and declared 
that the Atlantic Alliance was of “fundamental” importance and that US commitments 
to Europe remained unchanged. The new head of the Pentagon repeated the same 
declaration in Munich: “The transatlantic bond remains our strongest bulwark against 
instability and violence. NATO exists to protect our way of life” (Mattis, 2017).
NATO members were assured that NATO’s eastern flank would be strengthened. 
The deployment of US troops, started by the Obama administration, continued anyway, 
and in January 2017, 3,500 troops from the US armored brigade arrived in Poland, and 
a further 4,500 NATO troops were deployed in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 
by June 2017. washington did not send any signals that the new administration might 
want to withdraw from agreements made with the allies earlier, which was well re-
ceived in Central and Eastern European states.
Yet the announcements by high officials in the Trump administration have not dis-
pelled every doubt. These doubts were caused by the fact that in the US governance 
system final decisions are made by the President, who enjoys extremely broad com-
petences in the field of foreign affairs. Europeans were additionally concerned with 
1 This was the phrase President George H. w. Bush used during his visit to Germany in May 
1989, suggesting that Germany and the United States become “partners in leadership.”
86 Jadwiga Kiwerska RIE 12 ’18
Trump’s unpredictability and lability, which were aptly described by Republican sena-
tor John McCain in Munich: “The president […] makes statements and on other occa-
sions contradicts himself” (Erlanger, 2017; Blake, 2017).
Any declaration made by Trump had to be given such a margin of uncertainty, even 
when he addressed Congress on February 28, 2017, and confirmed strong US support 
for NATO (“we strongly support NATO”). Referring to NATO as “an alliance forged 
through the bonds of two world wars […] and a Cold war, and [which] defeated com-
munism,” Trump struck a familiar note present in the statements of other American 
presidents, who did not treat relations with Europe only in terms of a game for Ameri-
can interests, but also as a certain mission of America (President	Trump, 2017). This 
was a new note in the speeches uttered by this New York billionaire, which clearly 
referred to values that are difficult to calculate in business accounts. The question 
remained whether this milder rhetoric would be sufficient to talk about a more predict-
able and friendly European policy of the Trump administration. Appropriate words are 
needed, but expectations can only be fulfilled by acts.
The US President repeated the words about the importance of NATO in April 2017 
when meeting NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The President admitted that he 
thought the NATO was “no longer obsolete” and that he appreciated its importance and 
potential (Joint	press	conference, 2017). This declaration eased the tension and insecuri-
ty among European allies. Nevertheless, it was utterly unthinkable that such reassurance 
was needed on a matter that for several decades had been imperative to US and European 
security, that is the US presence in Europe, and US responsibilities as the fundamental 
pillar of the Atlantic pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and its essential element. This was 
a simple outcome of Trump’s earlier rhetoric, which deprecated NATO, and of insecurity 
about the true intentions of the new inhabitant in the white House.
President Trump consistently returned in his speeches to the demand he had made 
during his election campaign that NATO member states have to increase their defense 
budgets and “pay their fair share.” He said before Congress that “our partners must meet 
their financial obligations” (President	Trump, 2017). Vice President Michael Pence ex-
pressed a similar expectation when during the conference in Munich he reminded his 
listeners that, apart from the United States, only four member states meet the criterion of 
2% of GdP earmarked for defense. “The promise to share the burden of our defense has 
not been fulfilled by too many for too long, and it erodes the foundations of our alliance,” 
he said. “The president […] expects our allies to keep their word, to fulfill this commit-
ment, and for most, this means, the time has come to do more” (Jones, 2017).
whereas the new President’s standpoint on NATO and its usefulness has evolved, 
the Trump administration remained adamant about “burden sharing.” The consistency 
and severity of the new administration on this issue was striking. At a meeting with 
the heads of defense of NATO states, held in Brussels in February 2017, defense 
Secretary J. Mattis conditioned the degree of US commitment to European security 
on member states presenting an agenda for their meeting the requirement of earmark-
ing 2% of their respective GdPs for defense, something they had committed to at the 
Newport summit. The head of the Pentagon addressed his counterparts from NATO 
member states saying that “Americans cannot care more for your children’s future 
security than you do” (Cooper, 2017).
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It was difficult to reject this argument, but it should be recognized that in 2016 the 
expenses borne by European members of the Alliance and Canada increased by a total 
of 3.8% which translates into nearly USd 10 billion. Given the earlier downward trend 
of defense expenditure in Europe, this indicator was significant. Its significance was 
not diminished by the fact that in 2016, the United States allocated USd 664 billion for 
defense, an equivalent of 3.6% of GdP, and that by virtue of President Trump’s deci-
sion this budget was increased by further USd 54 billion, or 9% (Cooper, 2017).
The issue of burden sharing kept recurring at every meeting of Trump with Euro-
pean leaders. Not many of them paid visits to the United States in the first year of his 
presidency, anyway. The above-mentioned Stoltenberg was one of them. At a joint 
press conference with NATO Secretary General, President Trump argued that “if other 
countries pay their fair share instead of relying on the United States to make up the 
difference, we will be much more secure and our partnership will be made that much 
stronger” (Joint	press	conference, 2017).
The subject of European outlays for defense emerged also during the visit of Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel to washington in mid-March 2017. This issue clearly prevailed 
over many other addressed during the German Chancellor’s visit to the white House. 
In a short announcement, the US President read out during their joint press conference, 
he stressed the fact that while NATO remains an important American alliance, other 
member states need to increase their financial commitment nevertheless. He said that 
Germany “owed vast sum” to the United States, which clearly irritated Chancellor Mer-
kel (Herszernhorn, 2017); this matter should not be viewed in terms of the indebtedness 
of NATO allies in washington, but rather as their clearly smaller defense budgets.
This first meeting of Chancellor Merkel and President Trump left the impres-
sion that the latter appreciated the role of neither Germany, nor the importance of 
good American-German relations. This impression could not be altered even by the 
President’s tweet that this was a “great meeting,” an expression which Trump actu-
ally repeated several days later in an interview for the “Financial Times.” Contrary to 
President Obama, who believed Chancellor Merkel to be his best ally, and who even 
talked about American-German partnership (Kiwerska, 2017b, pp. 75–88), President 
Trump did not recognize the position of Germany as the informal European leader, 
with enormous economic and political potential. Or maybe Germany’s leadership in 
the European Union was the very factor which inspired the resentment and irritation of 
the eccentric inhabitant of the white House.
At any rate, Merkel-Trump meeting demonstrated the enormous differences in their 
political styles and thinking about international situation. Chancellor Merkel decided 
to visit the United States, despite Trump’s waspish remarks about her refugee policy, 
which he considered to be a “tragic mistake,” and his words that he trusted her as much 
as he trusted Putin. Her decision demonstrated that she was ready to go to great lengths 
on behalf of the European community in order to maintain a strong transatlantic bond, 
which was important both for European security and the position of the United States. 
Therefore, in the presence of US President, she presented a global outlook on the in-
ternational situation and stressed the importance of cooperation between America and 
Europe in resolving problems. This was in stark contrast with the intellectually meager 
statement of Trump who focused on minor problems.
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It can therefore be said that, paradoxically, Merkel came to the United States to 
convince the US President that Germany was a friend and not an enemy of the United 
States; that even in the field of economy and trade common goals need to be sought, in-
stead of stressing competition; finally, that there is no alternative to close cooperation 
between America and Germany/Europe. In the past, it was not necessary to make such 
efforts, despite occasional, temporary crises in American-German relations, which did 
not stem from a lack of understanding of the importance of collaboration, but rather 
from different standpoints, for instance on the American military intervention in Iraq.
The attitude of President Trump to the European Union continued to raise doubts, 
especially in the light of the visit UK Prime Minister Theresa May, paid to washing-
ton on January 23, 2017. She was the first foreign guest to the White House after the 
inauguration of Trump’s presidency. The US President treated the head of the UK 
government, who was embarking on the process of Brexit at the time, most cordially, 
announcing that a free trade agreement would be signed with the United Kingdom. It 
was as if he was trying to reassure the British that they had been right in opting for 
Brexit, and encouraging other states to take the same path. This could suggest that he 
maintained his opinions voiced during the election campaign when he disparaged the 
EU and drew a negative picture of its future; that he continued not to treat the EU as 
a strategic partner, but as a trade competitor, and would implement the policy of differ-
entiation towards EU member states. Steve Bannon, chief advisor to the white House, 
said openly that the United States would negotiate better conditions in bilateral trade 
agreements signed with individual states.
with time, President Trump abandoned his anti-EU rhetoric. He admitted in a press 
interview, that his expectations that Brexit would bring about further exits, leading to 
the collapse of the EU, had not been realized. Therefore, he said that EU leaders “have 
done a very good job in bringing it [the EU] back together” (Donald Trump, 2017). Yet 
this did not entail his appreciation for the EU project, or treating the EU as a strategic 
economic partner. The EU has remained a competitor for Trump, a rival even, who 
enjoyed too large a surplus of export over import in trade exchange with the United 
States.
Concerns about the direction of US foreign policy and the future of American-
European relations have remained valid. The responsibility and predictability of the 
new inhabitant of the White House remained doubtful. Therefore, Trump’s first visit 
to Europe raised great expectations and hopes of dispelling misunderstandings and 
ambiguities. The Brussels meeting with European leaders on May 25, 2017, however, 
was only one stage on the first foreign journey of the new President, who visited Saudi 
Arabia and Israel first, thereby implying that Europe is no longer a top US ally.
European concerns about the intentions of the new administration were not dispelled 
at the meeting of Trump, the President of the European Council, and the President of 
the European Commission. The official announcement issued by Donald Tusk said that 
the main difference of opinions pertained to free trade and climate issues. These were 
also the subjects of Trump’s extreme criticism during his election campaign. It turned 
out that his opinions had not changed, in particular those on the climate agreement 
signed in Paris on december 12, 2015, aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gases. Given that climate change was one of the EU’s main concerns, Trump’s skep-
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ticism about the Paris Climate Accord and his denial of the greenhouse effect were 
detrimental to Washington-Brussels relations. Other differences concerned Russia and 
its policy, which was essential for European security. Another thing that could hardly 
be overlooked concerned President Trump’s failure to directly address the European 
Union in public, recognize its role and importance, and support its integration efforts, 
which was in contrast to what his predecessors visiting Brussels used to do.
Other issues prevailed at an informal NATO summit, which was organized in Brus-
sels for the purpose of facilitating a meeting of NATO member states with the US 
President. Although Trump’s address included the sentence that NATO “promoted se-
curity and peace worldwide,” the matter of burden sharing was strongly back. The 
President stringently rebuked member states saying that the allies “owe vast sums of 
money for past years” and that “NATO members must finally contribute their fair share 
and meet their financial obligations.” His words were received as arrogant and lacking 
understanding for many internal determinants in individual NATO member states.
It also appeared that the American President either does not appreciate, or views it 
as utterly obvious, that NATO had joined the coalition fighting against Islamic State 
(a fight some member states had participated in on an individual basis). The declara-
tion to join this fight had been negotiated by Stoltenberg with all NATO member states 
as a gesture towards President Trump, who had accused the Alliance of weak involve-
ment in combating terrorism. NATO committed itself to training and intelligence op-
erations, and did not actually join combat, but this was an expression of the solidarity 
of the allies.
Europe wanted the meeting in Brussels to be a manifestation of the unity and im-
portance of NATO, which seemed highly necessary, given Trump’s earlier statements. 
Nothing of the sort happened, though. what is more, the meeting lacked the accent 
that would be the strongest manifestation possible of unconditional help offered in the 
case of one of the member states being attacked. Trump did not make any reference in 
his speech to Article 5 of the washington Treaty. In other circumstances this could be 
viewed as an irrelevant oversight since the principle of ‘one for all, all for one’ was in 
force. However, since Trump questioned the obligatory character of Article 5 before, 
he was expected to confirm the US obligation of mutual defense. In the past, every US 
President had made such a declaration, including a highly unambiguous statement is-
sued by President Obama in 2014, after the Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine.
It may be assumed that President Trump’s lack of endorsement of Article 5 (it is 
unofficially said that the text drawn up for the President and approved by his Security 
Advisor Herbert R. McMaster included the relevant section) was not an oversight but 
a conscious act by the President (Glasser, 2017a).2 It is difficult to rule out that it was 
intended as a kind of blackmail of European allies, who should pay more if they want 
US protection, and if the principle of mutual defense is to be observed. The President 
was not deterred by exceptional circumstances – he delivered his speech at NATO’s 
new headquarters in Brussels, standing next to a monument commemorating the ter-
rorist attack of September 11, 2001, when Article 5 of the washington Treaty was im-
2 According to unofficial sources, the main influence was exercised by the Chief Strategist Steve 
Bannon and Policy Advisor Stephen Miller.
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plemented for the first, and so far only time, in the name of solidarity with the United 
States.
Failing to refer to Article 5 on this occasion undermined the US’s trustworthiness 
as an ally, and that at the moment when international order was shaking. The principle 
of the solidarity of the allies, which had been imperative in American-European rela-
tions for nearly seventy years, ceased to be obligatory. American experts wrote for 
instance: “Trump’s failure to endorse Article 5 may come to be one of the greatest dip-
lomatic blunders made by an American president since world war II” (wright, 2017b). 
Strobe Talbott, a member of the Clinton administration, who was involved in enlarging 
NATO and adapting it to the challenges of the post-Cold war era, was convinced that 
the “failure to say something [about Article 5] has had a very dangerous and damaging 
effect on the most successful military alliance in history.” Now, after Trump’s speech 
in Brussels, Talbott argued that the “Atlantic community was less safe, and less to-
gether” (Glasser, 2017b).
The issue of Russia was justifiably mentioned. Trump’s undermining of Article 5 
gave Russia food for thought, and could produce dangerous outcomes. The worst sce-
nario in the case of undermined western solidarity involved Putin obtaining broader 
opportunities to implement his imperial ambition. In a slightly better option, it facili-
tated the Kremlin’s thesis that we are living in a post-western world, where western 
values and principles no longer dominate and do not determine the direction of de-
velopment and transformation. In any case, Europe and American-European relations 
would suffer (Stelzenmüller, 2017a; Glasser, 2017).
Under such circumstances, Trump’s endorsement of America’s responsibility to-
wards its allies following from Article 5, made during his visit to warsaw on July 6, 
2017, seemed to be forced, and failed to appease European concerns about future re-
lations with the United States. It is true that President Trump said that “the United 
States has demonstrated not merely with words but with its actions that we stand firmly 
behind Article 5, the mutual defense commitment,” but the very next sentence of his 
speech delivered in warsaw referred to the unsatisfactory commitment of European 
allies to the financing of joint defense. While this speech lacked any anti-European 
elements, there were no words of appreciation of the EU either, as a structure which 
both unites states and ensures European development and stability. The impression 
that Trump’s reluctance toward the European project continues remained.
Europe’s uncertainty about the degree of US commitment to European security 
inspired European leaders to act. In May 2017, Chancellor Merkel uttered her famous 
words that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over […]. we Europeans 
truly have to take our fate into our own hands” (Merkel	nach	Gipfel, 2017). These new 
circumstances produced a Permanent Structured Cooperation Agreement (PESCO), 
inspired by Germany and France. Signed by twenty-five EU members in November 
and december 2017, it strengthened defense cooperation within the EU. In the near fu-
ture, it might limit Europe’s dependence on the United States in the area of security.
That it is difficult for Europe, and in particular for the leaders of the greatest Euro-
pean powers, to come to an understanding with President Trump could be seen at the 
G7 and EU leaders’ summit in Sicily on May 26–27, 2017, and at the G20 meeting 
in Hamburg on July 7–8, 2017. Their participants sought to persuade US President 
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to acknowledge that climate warming is a real problem, and not to withdraw his sig-
nature from the Paris Agreement. Just several days after the talks in Sicily, however, 
on June 1, 2017, Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from Paris 
Agreement, which he justified with American interests and concerns about ensuring 
workplaces for American laborers. He remained steadfast during the G20 summit. The 
announcement concluding this summit included the statement that the United States 
was withdrawing from the provisions of the Paris agreement.
The United States’ pulling out of the climate agreement had tangible outcomes, 
both globally and in European relations. One involved the impact it would have for 
the climate, as the United States is the second greatest source of greenhouse gas emis-
sions after China. Opting for its own, rather than global interests, the United States 
consciously stepped down from the position of a global leader in combatting the green-
house effect; pulling out of its earlier commitments, the United States undermined its 
trustworthiness, in particular in view of European states, a vast majority of which are 
strongly committed to preventing climate change and who see the Paris Agreement as 
a milestone in their endeavors. The new US administration turned out to have a differ-
ent outlook and to follow its own narrowly understood interest, rather than the prin-
ciples and values attributed to western liberalism, as aptly expressed in the following 
words: “America First means America First, and not just in America, but everywhere 
on the globe” (Stelzenmüller, 2017b).
At the G20 summit in Hamburg, in turn, a compromise was reached on the wording 
of the provision of free trade (including the maintenance of open markets and prevent-
ing protectionism). It was recognized as an enormous success that Trump, an advocate 
of protectionism and opponent of multilateral trade agreements, was persuaded to back 
these solutions, or so it seemed at the time. This was an important achievement for the 
EU, a promoter of the liberal economic order, and in particular for the export-oriented 
German economy. Therefore this success was attributed to Chancellor Merkel, who 
managed to win Trump’s support for free trade regulations.
when, several months later, on March 9, 2018, Trump announced his intention to 
raise prices for steel and aluminum, this could be viewed as his breaking earlier agree-
ments. More importantly, however, the threat of a trade war emerged in American-
European relations. Initially, the EU avoided penalty tariffs as they were primarily 
imposed on Chinese imports whereas negotiations with Europe were scheduled until 
May 1, 2018. Nevertheless, the prospect of yet another American-European conflict 
affecting the economic interests of European states aroused emotions which sparked 
the diplomatic activity of European leaders.
Firstly, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, arrived in the United States, 
clearly outpacing Chancellor Merkel in the field of relations with Trump. Whereas she 
never established a close relationship and understanding with the incumbent US Presi-
dent, Macron demonstrated greater eagerness to talk to Trump. Receiving him with 
honors on Bastille day on July 14, 2017, Macron earned recognition in washington. 
As a consequence, he paid a state visit to the United States from April 23 to 25, 2018, 
which provided him with the opportunity to demonstrate close and cordial relations 
with Trump. Chancellor Merkel came to the United States with a working visit of 
several hours, on April 27, 2018. Yet the purpose of both visits was the same, namely 
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to prevent the imposition of higher tariffs for the EU and pressure President Trump 
on the matters of international security, first and foremost on maintaining the nuclear 
agreement with Iran.
The Obama administration (and Russia, China, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and the EU) signed a document (Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA) 
providing for Iran halting its nuclear program in return for sanctions being lifted, 
which was considered an enormous achievement in Europe. The Trump adminis-
tration, however, denied its importance, arguing that it does not block the Iranian 
nuclear program and is actually harmful. President Trump was to make his deci-
sion on the future of the JCPOA by May 12, 2018, which was precisely the reason 
for Merkel’s and Macron’s visits. Both Berlin and Paris feared that declining the 
JCPOA might translate into increased tension in the Middle East, a possibly intensi-
fied nuclear arms race, and the repeated complication of Europe-Iran trade relations, 
which were being reinstated so painstakingly after the period of Iran’s isolation on 
the international arena.
As concerns tariffs on imports from the EU, the two European leaders have been 
partially successful. The Trump administration extended the period of the EU’s ex-
emption from US tariffs by one month, until June 1, 2018, thereby enabling negotia-
tions to continue. Trump, however, could not be persuaded about the importance of the 
agreement with Iran, even though Macron and Merkel suggested that the JCPOA be 
added with further agreements. As on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the 
US decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran, he put the entirety of 
the Middle East under the risk of further destabilization and undermined the transatlan-
tic alliance as well. European states were the signatories to the agreement, alongside 
Russia and China, finding themselves in clear opposition to Washington. The closest 
and most important US allies differed from the Trump administration over such an es-
sential matter for international situation as the future of the denuclearization process 
and security in the Middle East. It was a paradox that their allies on these subjects were 
Russia and China. It is therefore not an exaggeration to conclude that it is a difficult 
time for American-European relations and their future is uncertain.
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Summary
The paper analyzes European-American relations in the time of donald Trump’s adminis-
tration. Attention is drawn to the problems that appeared between the United States and Europe 
as a result of the actions of the new administration in terms of fundamental issues, such as 
security, economic relations, trust, and attachment to the values of the west. Trump seems to be 
the first American President who has no recognition of integration efforts in Europe. Also the 
American-German relations have been disturbed although they used to be called the “partner-
ship in leadership” and represented an important component of the transatlantic system.
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Streszczenie
W artykule poddano analizie relacje amerykańsko-europejskie w okresie urzędowania 
Donalda Trumpa. Zwrócono uwagę na problemy, jakie pojawiły się na linii Ameryka–Europa 
w efekcie działań nowej administracji, a dotyczące kwestii zasadniczych, takich jak: bezpie-
czeństwo, stosunki gospodarcze, wzajemne zaufanie, wiarygodność. Zachwianiu uległy także 
relacje amerykańsko-niemieckie, jeszcze niedawno określane „partnerstwem w przywództwie” 
i stanowiące ważny komponent układu transatlantyckiego. Brak uznania dla wysiłku integra-
cyjnego Europy także nie służy dobrze wspólnocie euroatlantyckiej.
 
Słowa kluczowe: USA, Unia Europejska, NATO, stosunki transatlantyckie, Trump
